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To expand intermittent renewable electricity sources (RESs), worldwide energy policy makers have
introduced fixed feed-in tariffs (FITs). However, FITs typically expire after a limited time period. Due to
the intermittent electricity supply of RES, market distortions, and insufficient flexibility options, exclusive
participation in wholesale electricity markets might not be a viable business model for RES that no longer
receive a FIT. Thus, it remains unclear which RES business models (RBMs) ensure a viable operation of
RES in the post FIT era. To close this research gap, we present a typology encompassing five RBM ar-
chetypes: wholesale electricity market (1), physical power purchase agreements (2), nonphysical power
purchase agreements (3), self-consumption (4), and on-site power-2-X (5). The typology includes three
additional service layers, which may enhance the profitability of RBM archetypes by opening up addi-
tional revenue streams: infrastructure services (1), electricity storage services (2), and ancillary services (3).
We highlight the need for new approaches to quantify the viability of RBM archetypes and services layers
under different regulatory, technological, and market conditions. To prevent the imminent decom-
missioning of existing RESs, policy makers must shape the next era of the energy transition, weighting
the implications of market-based and intervention-based energy policy approaches.
© 2020 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).1. Introduction
In a world exposed to the fundamental threat of climate change,
the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions induced by electricity
generation is an inevitable challenge. Energy transition via the
integration of intermittent renewable electricity sources (RESs)
provides a means of reducing the use of fossil energy sources,
which is an immensely complex endeavor [1,2]. To accelerate the
energy transition, the expansion of RES capacities became a subject
of energy policy nearly two decades ago. In hindsight, countries
spearheading progress (e.g., Denmark in 1992, Spain in 1998, and
Germany in 2000) initiated energy policy measures encompassing
extensive financial support for the expansion of RES [3e5]. When
designed effectively, fixed feed-in tariffs (FITs) have been demon-
strated to be highly successful in stimulating technological progress
and investor adaption [6e8], making FITs the most prevalent formeibelzahl).
r Ltd. This is an open access articlof financial guarantees for RES [9]. Alongside falling investments for
RES-related technologies, the extensive intervention-based policy
approach of FITs significantly increased the development of RES in
electricity markets. Today, electricity from RES accounts for a sub-
stantial share of electricity generation in the first moving countries,
such as Denmark with 50% [10], Spain with 37% in [11], and Ger-
many with 42% in 2019 [12].
With an increasing share of renewable energies, however, the
financing of FITs requires reallocation via levies on electricity con-
sumers, thus yielding an increasing financial burden [13].
Furthermore, electricity market price signals are distorted by RES
receiving a FIT, which may hinder the expansion of flexibility
technologies required for a successful energy transition over time
[14]. As a result, the intervention-based policy approach of FITs is
discussed and challenged [13,15] causing policy makers to consider
completely terminating FIT programs [16].
For individual RESs, a FIT expires after an ex-ante known period
of time. A FIT expiration leaves existing RES owners uncertain about
their economically viable business operation in a corresponding
transition phase to a post FIT era. From an RES owner’s perspective,e under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
List of abbreviations (in order of appearance)
RES renewable electricity source
FIT fixed feed-in tariff
RBM renewable electricity business model
CES conventional electricity source
PPA power purchase agreement
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besides operational costs, for instance maintenance costs must be
continuously recovered to ensure a profitable operation in an era
post FITs. Overall, there are three options after the expiration of
FITs: (i) continued operation of a plant if RES owners identify an
economically viable business opportunity; (ii) decommissioning of
a plant if RES owners fail to identify an economically viable busi-
ness opportunity; or (iii) additional investment in the repowering
of existing plants. To not further lose pace in the transition to a low-
carbon energy system, policy makers must ensure that the majority
of RES owners chooses options (i) or (iii). As an increasing number
of RES will be affected by such an expiration, option (ii) bears a
substantial risk for high shares of today’s RESs being shut down.
Without granted FIT, one traditional business model is based on
revenues from selling generated electricity in wholesale electricity
markets. However, the high penetration of intermittent RES and
missing flexibility strongly affects the established wholesale elec-
tricitymarket price dynamics [17,18] in such away that in periods of
high electricity generation from intermittent RESs, wholesale
electricity prices vastly decline due to temporal oversupply [19,20].
The coexistence of RESs that still receive a FIT and RESs whose FIT
already expiredmay lead to a situationwhere the latter are not able
to cover a minimum of operational costs necessary for a viable
operation. Currently, the necessity for new approaches to these
economic challenges associated with the forthcoming expiration of
FITs has led to a rise in lobbying, calling for fall-arrest energy policy
interventions to prevent RESs from being shut down, as can be
observed in Germany [21]. While the economic viability of RESs
with FIT is well understood in the literature (for example refer to
Karakaya et al. [22], Burger and Luke [23], and Yu et al. [24]), and
challenges associated with the FIT expiration are partially
addressed by Huijben and Verbong [25], Djørup et al. [26], and
Blazquez et al. [27], a profound understanding of the consequences
for the economic viability of RES business models (RBMs) in a phase
where RESs with FIT and RESs without FIT compete is lacking.
However, RBMs might even open-up opportunities for option (iii),
which would not only avoid to stall, but to accelerate the energy
transition by repowering amortized RES with new technical com-
ponents as renewable electricity technologies made significant
progress in output per RES over time. Therefore, with this study we
aim to contribute to closing this research gap by answering the
following research questions: Which business opportunities for RES
exist in a post FIT era, and how can they be structured in RBM
archetypes?
To answer this research question, we developed a typology
encompassing five archetypes of RBMs as well as three service
layers that may support each RBM archetype by creating additional
revenue streams. Building on this RBM typology, we discuss im-
plications for the forthcoming energy transition from two per-
spectives: the RES owner perspective on viable business models,
and the policy maker perspective on policy implications for
different intervention- or market-based approaches.
This article is structured as follows: Section 2 presents the
existing literature relevant to the research question stated. In2
Section 3, we illustrate the challenges associated with the expira-
tion of FITs using a stylized academic example. Section 4 presents
our research approach of developing a typology of RBMs alongside
the business model canvas [28]. The main results are presented in
Section 5, and policy implications are highlighted in Section 6.
Finally, we draw conclusions in Section 7.
2. Related literature on FITs, wholesale electricity market
dynamics, and RBMs
This section provides an overview of existing literature con-
cerned with (1) the conception of FITs, (2) effects of such RES
support policies on wholesale electricity market prices, (3) associ-
ated risks for existing RES, and (4) approaches including the busi-
ness model canvas to develop and characterize business models in
the energy sector.
2.1. FITs are effective support policies for the integration of RES.
Studies byMenanteau et al. [29], Lesser and Su [7], Held et al. [6],
and Pahle et al. [30] concluded that if effectively designed, FIT
programs are most successful in stimulating technological progress
and investors’ adaption to RESs at the lowest cost to society
compared to other RES support policies. Being applied in 83
countries [31] across the globe, FITs are the most frequently
adopted form of financial guarantee and the dominant support
policy for simulating the integration of RESs in energy systems.
Alizada [9] provided a review of the global adoption of FIT pro-
grams and investigated policy diffusion mechanisms (emulation,
suasion, learning, and competition) that facilitate the widespread
application of FITs on a national government level. As the design
and implementation of FIT programs differ considerably between
countries and depend on specific conditions/requirements of an
energy system, Couture and Gagnon [32], and Pyrgou et al. [15]
outlined the evolution of FITs. They also provided a comprehensive
overview and characterization of FIT design options together with
corresponding remuneration schemes and discussed the advan-
tages and disadvantages of different FIT program designs.
Furthermore, by elucidating the interactions among design options,
program parameters, and FIT program performance, Kim and Lee
[3] proposed a quantitative model to evaluate and optimize FIT
programs focusing on four different payoff structures. Analyzing
the experiences from a number of first moving countries in Europe,
Fouquet and Johansson [33] suggested that the specific design and
stability of the remuneration scheme is essential to achieve high
innovation incentives and simultaneously mitigate investor risks to
safeguard further RES development.
2.2. RES and FITs lead to a decline in wholesale electricity market
prices.
The literature advocates that FIT programs entail substantial
effects on wholesale electricity market price dynamics. Sensfub
et al. [34] provided a detailed analysis of the effects of privileged
RES feed-in on spot market prices in Germany. Their results
demonstrated that in the short-run, market prices decline as RES
generation increases. This implies reduced profits for electricity
generators. DeMiera et al. [35] found similar results induced by RES
support schemes for the Spanish market region. Summarizing
previous studies on the effects of an increasing RES supply on
traditional wholesale electricity market mechanisms, Würzburg
et al. [19] presented a comprehensive review of simulation-based
and empirical research and conducted an empirical analysis on
the price effect of RES supply for the Austrian-German-
Luxembourgish market region. The results confirm a temporal
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intermittent feed-in of the RES electricity supply. Furthermore,
Ballester and Furio [18] performed a detailed review and analysis of
the effects of RES supply on electricity prices and found that a high
share of RESs on electricity supply not only leads to temporarily low
or even negative wholesale electricity prices but also to an
increased price volatility due to the intermittency of RES supply. De
Vos [36] found negative wholesale electricity prices in periods of
peak RES electricity generation to be a consequence of (1) renew-
able support mechanisms causing market distortion and (2) the
system’s scarcity of downward flexibility to temporarily reduce RES
feed-in to prevent a market situation of electricity oversupply.
Therefore, De Vos [36] called for new flexibility services to enter the
market on the supply or demand side. More specifically, Paraschiv
et al. [20] discussed the implications of a FIT policy intervention on
day-ahead electricity prices and confirmed that the expansion of
RESs stimulated by FIT programs foster extreme price changes and
a temporal decrease in prices that pose new challenges for the
successful marketing of electricity.2.3. RES without FITs on wholesale electricity markets risk falling
victim to their own success.
Linking the effects of RES electricity supply on wholesale elec-
tricity market prices with the operation of current RESs, Djørup
et al. [26] analyzed the extent to which a wholesale electricity
market design can support a strong increase in RES capacities. The
results of their study reveal that traditional market designs may
hinder the increased marketing of RESs without upholding FIT
programs due to declining revenue prospects for existing RESs;
they conclude that wholesale markets must be redesigned when
FITs expire. Based on the finding of negative wholesale electricity
prices in periods of high electricity generation from RESs, Blazquez
et al. [27] stressed the fact that RESs capture a high share of elec-
tricity supply in liberalized electricity markets, which may lead to
declining revenue prospects for already existing RESs and
decreasing investment incentives for candidate RES plants. There-
fore, the authors argue that without FIT, renewables could fall
victim to their own success. Although the issue of shrinking reve-
nue prospects due to declining wholesale electricity market prices
due to high RES feed-in is widely addressed in the current litera-
ture, none of the existing studies address how RES owners and
future investors can identify alternative opportunities to market
electricity besides participating in traditional wholesale electricity
markets against the background of expiring FITs.2.4. Existing literature lacks an overview of RMBs from an RES
owner’s perspective.
The imminent development of economically viable business
models is a prerequisite for future sustainable energy systems that
are capable of uphold and further increase the share of RES.
Applying the business model canvas [28], multiple studies have
proposed business models for utilities in the past. Bryant et al. [37]
analyzed 50 Asian and European energy utilities and identified 4
emerging energy utility business model typologies addressing the
strong need for innovation and new value propositions for today’s
energy utilities to deal with changing conditions in energymarkets.
Richter [38] conducted a review of business model literature for
utilities and identified two fundamental approaches for traditional
utilities to reformulate their business model with respect to the
inherent logic of value creation to remain competitive in the future
energy landscape. Investigating the status quo of utility business
models for renewable energies in Germany, Richter [39] found that3
utilities have developed viable business models for large-scale
utility-side renewable energy generation but lack viable business
models to commercialize small-scale customer-side renewable
energy technologies. By collecting and analyzing data from com-
pany websites, Chasin et al. [40] derived eight smart energy busi-
ness model archetypes for utilities that either place the provision of
services or tangible products to end consumers at the heart of value
creation. However, although highly relevant for the future opera-
tion of the electricity system on a holistic level, business models for
standalone RES remain unexplored in these studies.
Engelken et al. [41] systematically reviewed existing research on
business models for renewable energies in more general and pro-
vided a structured overview of corresponding drivers, barriers, and
opportunities. Burger and Luke [23] identified a set of business
model archetypes by classifying 144 empirical business models in
the energy sector. However, the scope of their study is restricted to
an empirical analysis of the current business model landscape of
demand response and energy management systems, electricity and
thermal storage, and solar PV resources. The authors present spe-
cific business model archetypes for each resource category. How-
ever, the study does not provide a generic conceptualization of
business model archetypes that can be applied to RES in general but
rather focuses on specific service categories or technologies.
A plethora of research contributions have studied business
models for particular RES technologies. The most relevant studies
are the following: Horvath and Szabo [42] investigated the evolu-
tion of business models based on solar photovoltaic technology and
review main inhibiting factors of a corresponding distributed en-
ergy deployment. Considering citizens and communities as po-
tential RES owners, Nolden et al. [43] analyzed three past to present
community energy business models for solar photovoltaic. They
conclude that following the expiration of subsidies, which previ-
ously supported the adoption of renewable energy projects on a
community level, new emerging intermediaries will play a key role
in reviving increasingly complex energy business models. Focusing
on wind power producers, Gonzalez-Aparicio et al. [44] proposed a
joint business model that combines selling electricity from wind
power generation on wholesale electricity markets with carbon
dioxide utilization by producing methanol to be sold to third
parties. Several scenarios for market participation are tested within
the proposed business model to define conditions for an optimal
business model operation. Based on a literature review, Kooshknow
and Davis [45] addressed the challenges associated with the
intermittent nature of RES electricity generation, providing a con-
ceptual framework for the design of electricity storage business
models. Focusing on a specific business model, Proka et al. [46]
analyzed the collaborative neighborhood battery concept for elec-
tricity storage focusing on the collaboration between a network
operator and renewable energy initiatives on local energy storage.
Focusing on the decentralization of the energy system, Brinker and
Satchwell [47] analyzed municipal energy business models,
revealed energy decentralization dynamics, and concluded that
energy policy plays a critical role in energy decentralization.
Focusing on peer-to-peer energy communities, Plewnia and
Guetnher [48] presented a multiple case study to investigate
respective value propositions to stakeholders and the overall en-
ergy system. Closest to the research question of this paper, Leisen
et al. [49] identified six sustainable business models found along
the electricity value chain, including electricity consumption,
generation, procurement, and grid balancing. The authors analyzed
the respective economic logic using the business model canvas.
However, their study does not provide an overview or detailed
characterization of viable business models that can generally be
applied from an RES owners’ perspective and is rather dedicated to
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respect to the risk of regulatory changes.
As current research demonstrates, a standalone participation in
traditional wholesale electricity markets may not represent a viable
business opportunity after the expiration of FITs any longer, leaving
current RES owners with uncertainty about the future operation of
their existing RESs. However, the scope of existing studies on
business models in the energy sector is limited to the application of
single technologies, case studies, or the characteristics of specific
stakeholders along the electricity value chain, for example, com-
munity networks or utilities. To the best of the authors’ knowledge,
none of the reviewed studies provides a conceptualization of
renewable energy business models that generally entail the po-
tential to open up future perspectives for today’s RES owners.
Therefore, we aim to analyze the economic implications for existing
RBMs associated with the individual expiration and the general
termination of FITs and identify archetypes of RBMs that may serve
as future pathways for RES owners to create, deliver, and capture
value.
3. RES in a post FIT era: A stylized example of traditional
wholesale marketing
In this section, we provide an understanding of the main chal-
lenges associated with the viable operation of RESs in the post FIT
era. In particular, we consider an economic situation where RESs
with FIT and RESs without FIT compete against each other on the
same wholesale electricity market. Using a stylized, illustrative
example, we demonstrate that, especially in scenarios with high
RES supply, RESs without FIT may systematically be driven out of
the wholesale electricity market. Related findings were found by
Haas et al. [17], Blazquez et al. [27], and Djørup et al. [26] in the
scientific literature. Wallasch et al. [50,51] and Quentin et al. [52]
derive related results in a more practical context.
Following the standard of relevant economic literature, we
consider a linear decreasing electricity demand function
[53,54,101,102]. For the electricity supply side, we assume that
existing RES and existing conventional electricity sources (CESs)
feature a given maximum generation capacity and (constant) pos-
itive variable marginal generation costs. While the capacity of a CES
is determined by an ex-ante undertaken investment, the actual
generation capacity of an RES depends on current weather condi-
tions in addition to its nominal capacity. Further, we assume that allFig. 1. Wholesale electricity market scenario 1: low supply of RESs and all RESs receive
a FIT.
4
RES that still receive a FIT obtain a FIT that exceeds their marginal
electricity generation costs. In accordance with the technological
characteristics of RES, we assumed that RES features short-term
marginal electricity generation costs close to zero [18]. In the
following, we present our analysis and comparison of three
different market scenarios.3.1. Wholesale electricity market scenario 1: Low supply of RESs
and all RESs receive a FIT
First, we consider a market scenario with a low RES supply. All
RESs receive a FIT. As illustrated in Fig.1, themerit order of RESs and
CESs constitutes the aggregated stepwise market supply function.
This function gives the short-term marginal costs of electricity
generation in ascending order. The intersection point of the elec-
tricity demand and supply function yields the equilibrium price p*.
Assuming a situation with low RES supply, the equilibrium price is
determined by the most expensive CESs that still successfully par-
ticipates in the market. All RESs successfully sell their available
generation capacity and receive the guaranteed FIT. The levy-
financed RES premium compensates for the difference between
the equilibrium price p* and guaranteed FIT.3.2. Wholesale electricity market scenario 2: High supply of RESs
and all RESs receive a FIT.
Electricity systems that extensively adopt FITs are now typically
characterized by a growing installed generation capacity of RES.
This implies that in an increasing number of market scenarios,
electricity demand is entirely satisfied by RES. The wholesale
electricity market scenario with a high RES supply is depicted in
Fig. 2. As per the assumption that all RESs receive a FIT, there is no
price incentive for RES owners to reduce electricity supply in such a
scenario [27]. Ultimately, the high RES supply leads to a reduced
equilibrium price, which is negative in the present case. Even if we
do not expect permanently negative equilibrium prices to repre-
sent a long-run wholesale electricity market scenario, short-term
negative prices are expected to occur at least in the transition to-
wards a complete integration of RESs and are driven by both the
system’s lack of flexibility and the market distortion caused by the
renewable support mechanisms, that is, a FIT offers no incentive to
reduce feed-in of an RES [36]. Similar to the first scenario, all RESFig. 2. Wholesale electricity market scenario 2: high supply of RESs and all RESs
receive a FIT.
Fig. 3. Wholesale electricity market scenario 3: high supply of RESs and partially
expired FITs.
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ever, FITs are now the driver for a viable RES operation, as in the
present scenariowith a high RES supply, it would hardly be possible
to obtain any revenue on the market without a FIT.3.3. Wholesale electricity market scenario 3: High supply of RESs
and partially expired FITs.
In Fig. 3, we consider a scenario with a high electricity supply
from RESs but assume that FITs have already expired for some RESs.
Consequently, RESs without FIT must now compete against RESs
that still receive a FIT as well as against CESs. Even if the variable
costs of electricity generation are close to zero for RESs, Fig. 3 il-
lustrates that RESs without FIT are now driven out of the market
given the artificial (i.e., policy-driven) competitive advantage of
those RESs that still benefit from a FIT. This may pose severe
challenges for the future operation of RESs without FITs.
We note that while CESs may still run profitably in scenarios
with low RES supply and corresponding lower overall market
competition, RESs without FIT must compete against other RESs
due to the climatological induced correlation of electricity gener-
ation. Therefore, RESs without guaranteed FIT may suffer from an
artificially imposed competitive disadvantage. Therefore, the
traditional sale of electricity on wholesale electricity markets may
not be economically viable from the viewpoint of an RES owner
whose FIT has already expired. This is especially the case when the
variable generation costs exceed attainable revenues [26,27].
Without developing alternative RBMs, owners of existing RESs may
consider the decommissioning of their plants, and RES investorsFig. 4. Consecutive re
5
might be reluctant to implement new RESs projects without a
sufficient financial guarantee for a viable operation. This may pose a
severe threat to the energy transition, which could slow or entirely
cease function.4. Research approach to characterize RBM archetypes
Following an inductive research approach as proposed by Leisen
et al. [49] and Burger and Luke [23] in the field of RBMs, our
research approach consisted of three consecutive steps, which are
presented in Fig. 4. In the first step, we identified an exhaustive set
of instances of business models for RESs. For this reason, we con-
ducted a structured literature review in this field. Additionally, we
reviewed the German energy sector for empirical examples of
established and developing RBMs. To identify further business
models that are neither represented empirically nor in scientific
literature, we conducted a half-day workshop with a group of 15
research experts with a high level of expertise in the field of
energy-related research. In the second step, the authors charac-
terized all instances identified in the first step of the research
process individually and independently from each other by
applying the business model canvas along the nine dimensions of
(1) value proposition, (2) revenue stream, (3) cost structure, (4) key
activities, (5) key partners, (6) key resources, (7) customer seg-
ments, (8) customer relationships, and (9) channels as proposed by
Osterwalder and Pigneur [28]. After, the authors iteratively dis-
cussed their characterizations until they came to an agreement on
the characterization for all instances. In the third step, we collec-
tively derived RBM archetypes based on business model charac-
terizations in the business model canvas such that instantiations
with similar characteristics in the nine business model canvas di-
mensions were subsumed into an RBM archetype representing
them. However, all RBM archetypes are mutually exclusive. In this
step, supporting service layers, whose characteristics were not
specific to a single RBM archetype but instead offered a possible
extension of the economic success of an RBM archetype, were
identified from the characterized instantiations. These supporting
service layers can be seen as optional services that may enhance
each of the RBM archetypes. The RBM archetypes together with the
identified supporting services layers build the RBM typology.5. Typology of renewable electricity business models
The derived typology encompasses five RBM archetypes for
intermittent RESs, including the traditional wholesale electricity
market as well as four alternative RBMs. Section 5.1 presents a
detailed characterization of each RBM archetype. Furthermore, we
elaborated how the success of each RBM archetype may be
increased by additional supporting activities that we refer to as
service layers. A comprehensive characterization of the supporting
service layers is presented in Section 5.2.search approach.
Table 1
RBM archetype characterization along the business model canvas.
Wholesale electricity
market







Physical self-consumption of renewably generated
electricity, mitigation of levies and taxes (e.g., grid
tariffs), superiority of resource utilization (due to
regional generation and use), and electricity prices
per kWh (compared to purchasing electricity)
Physical provision of renewably generated
electricity, long-term electricity price risk
mitigation, mitigation of levies and taxes
(e.g., grid tariffs), renewable and regional
image
Provision of renewably generated
electricity, long-term electricity
price risk mitigation, renewable
image
Renewably generated energy carrier or
ubiquitous service, better resource
utilization (due to regional generation and




Electricity sale per sold unit
at the wholesale electricity
market
Electricity bill savings, (electricity surpluses sale per
generated unit in other RBMs)
Contractual determined remuneration
scheme for electricity sales (e.g., discrete,
continuous, indexed, capped, floored, per






indexed, capped, floored, per
unit, per capacity)
Sale of renewably generated “to X00 medium
(feed-in/-out control allows to exploit
wholesale and medium price fluctuations,
additional “to X00 services)





Renewables operation and maintenance, staff,
information and communication infrastructure,
additionally required local electricity grid, and smart
meter
Renewables operation and maintenance,
staff, information and communications






Renewables and electricity “to X00
conversion operation and maintenance,
staff, information and communication
infrastructure
Key activities Renewable electricity
generation and sale
Renewable electricity generation and sale,
maximizing self-consumption
Renewable electricity generation and sale Renewable electricity generation
and sale
Renewable electricity generation and “to X00
medium sale, ongoing medium storage,
feed-in/-out optimization
Key partners Direct marketer, technical
partners, grid operator,
investor, and regulator
Direct marketer, electricity consumers, technical
partners, grid operator, investor, and regulator
Energy service provider, electricity




partners, grid operator, investor,
and regulator
Direct marketer, buyer of “to X00 medium,
technical partners, grid operator, investor,
regulator
Key resources Renewable electricity
generation infrastructure
Renewable electricity generation infrastructure,
temporal flexible load
Renewable electricity generation








Direct marketer None Electricity consumers (e.g., local smart/





industrial) or (municipal) utility
companies








None Provision of renewably generated
electricity, "ethically" superior alternative
to the traditional utility, typically long-
term relationship
Provision of renewably generated
electricity, "ethically" superior
alternative to the traditional
utility, typically long-term
relationship







None Direct B2B interaction, end consumer or
peer interaction
Direct B2B interaction, end
consumer interaction










(e.g., RWE Supply &
Trading, Uniper)
Sonnen, Smart Home Products (e.g., Innogy, Magenta
(Telekom) Smart Home, Google Nest Thermostat)






ExaMesh, MAN Energy Solutions, Interatec,
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The first RBM archetype that we identified refers to the tradi-
tional marketing of electricity on the wholesale electricity market
(1). Referring to the next two RBM archetypes, generated electricity
may be marketed independent from an established marketplace in
bilateral physical (2) or nonphysical power purchase agreements (3).
Besides external marketing, electricity may also be used directly at
the location of generation to cover present electricity demand or to
transform electricity into another medium (e.g., hydrogen).
Therefore, we identified self-consumption (4) and on-site power-2-X
(5) as additional RBM archetypes. In the following, we describe the
value propositions and outline examples for each RBM archetype. A
full characterization of each archetype is given in Table 1.
5.1.1. Wholesale electricity market.
The first RBM archetype encompasses the sale of electricity on a
wholesale electricity market. The value proposition is exclusively
based on the sale of renewably generated electricity. An example is
the traditional electricity sale via a direct marketer on a national
electricity exchange, such as the European Energy Exchange or
Nord Pool. As highlighted in Section 3, the wholesale electricity
market is currently affected by the granted FITs and yields distorted
electricity prices. Therefore, it is unclear whether and to what
extent the wholesale electricity market serves as a standalone
business model in the post FIT era. Nevertheless, a combination
with supporting service layers may provide a basis for the viable
operation of this traditional RBM in the future.
5.1.2. Physical power purchase agreement.
In a physical power purchase agreement (PPA), two parties agree
on the physical supply of a predetermined electricity volume or
capacity at a specified price or renumeration scheme over a certain
contract period. A physical PPA may especially be useful if genera-
tion and consumption are geographically so close that a private,
local grid can transmit electricity. Ultimately, for both contractual
parties, a physical PPA allows a reduction in costs with respect to the
use of the public infrastructure e at least in cases where the
operation of a local, private electricity grid is less expensive. The
actual value proposition of a physical PPA is three-sided. First,
consumers may value the regional and renewable origin of the
generated electricity. Second, when electricity is previously trans-
mitted via public grids, the physical PPA may allow for possibly
reduced electricity charges (e.g., grid charges or taxes), depending
on the (future) regulatory environment. Thus, a physical PPA may
contribute to lower overall electricity procurement costs for buyers,
which allows them to (potentially) pay a higher renumeration than
the wholesale electricity market offers without FIT. Third, physical
PPAs represent a price risk mitigation instrument, as electricity
prices can be negotiated individually between the two parties over
a longer time period. However, a favorable specification of actual
contract characteristics can be challenging for both parties, as the
temporal availability of renewably generated electricity builds on
forecasts and is subject to uncertainty. Nevertheless, current ex-
amples of physical local electricity alliances in smart- or micro-
grids as well as peer-to-peer networks that match local electricity
generation and consumption represent promising applications of
physical PPAs.
5.1.3. Nonphysical power purchase agreement.
A nonphysical PPA is a (typically) bilateral long-term electricity
supply contract. In contrast to a physical PPA, there is no physical
connection between the electricity generation and consumption
unit. Instead, there is a location-independent replication of feed-in
and consumption profiles via a third party, such as an energy7
trading company. The value proposition encompasses the possi-
bility of mitigating electricity price risks, whereby different remu-
neration schemes can be applied. Similar to a physical PPA, the
renewable image of the supplied electricity may increase the value
of electricity for end consumers. However, for nonphysical PPAs,
contract design is a challenging task for all involved parties.
Therefore, different forms of nonphysical PPAs can be observed in
practice, for example, synthetic and sleeved PPAs where an energy
service provider handles many of the associated tasks, such as load
balancing or providing standard contracts.
5.1.4. Self-consumption.
The self-consumption RBM archetype refers to the consumption
of generated electricity by RES owners themselves without the use
of a public electricity grid that links generation and consumption
units. Rather, electricity is generated and consumed by the same
actor to cover its own electricity demand. The value proposition
relies on electricity bill savings due to reduced electricity costs, for
example, lower procurement costs, avoided or reduced grid fees,
and possible tax exemptions depending on the regulatory envi-
ronment. In this context, temporal flexibilization (e.g., by using
supporting electricity storage services) may additionally contribute
to an increase in electricity bill savings. A prominent example of
this RBM is photovoltaic panels installed on roofs of residential,
commercial, or industrial buildings, where owners or residents of
respective buildings directly consume the generated electricity
themselves.
5.1.5. On-site power-2-X.
In the last RBM archetype, generated electricity is transformed
into another medium that can be another energy carrier or an
electricity-consuming ubiquitous service. Recent examples include
the conversion of generated electricity into heat for local use,
hydrogen as a resource (e.g., used in industrial applications or for
hydrogen-based mobility use cases), and the provision of
computing power (for, e.g., cloud computing). The value proposi-
tion relies on the renewably produced X-medium supply and the
direct local use of electricity without the need for a wholesale
electricity purchase. Self-consumption also depends on the regula-
tory environment that affects and determines procurement costs,
grid fees, and possible tax exemptions that may make the local use
of electricity more attractive. Ultimately, the value proposition is
not based on utilizing renewable and local electricity per se, but
also on available marketing options for the transformed medium.
The latter has its own 2-X transformation and marketing costs as
well as risk and return characteristics that are different from those
of electricity markets. Therefore, for the newly generated medium,
business models relying on corresponding wholesale markets, self-
consumption, and purchase agreements may represent possible
sources of revenue.
The identified RBM archetypes wholesale electricity market as
well as physical and nonphysical power purchase agreements have
the sale of electricity as a key value driver in common. In contrast,
there is a significant difference in self-consumption and on-site po-
wer-2-X. Self-consumption relies on potential electricity bill savings,
which mainly result from lower grid charges or taxes compared to
the external purchase of electricity. On-site power-2-X revenue
streams are based on the sale of the medium to which electricity is
transformed. We note that given the different characteristics of the
presented RBMs, a combination of the five archetypes is possible
and may indeed offer additional value as an RES owner can opti-
mize his individual risk and return profile. For example, in cases
where own electricity demand is temporally satisfied by the locally
generated electricity (self-consumption), surpluses may be sold via a
nonphysical PPA to other consumers. Alternatively, the sale of a
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be combined with the use of remaining surpluses for an on-site
power-2-X conversion, for example, the use of electricity to offer
computing power. Another example is the combination of a
wholesale electricity market with a wholesale on-site power-2-X
market business model that reduces risks via participation in two
different markets. However, renewable electricity generation by
RES is the core of value creation in each RBM and therefore placed
in the center of the typology. Fig. 5 visually summarizes the iden-
tified RBM typology as a whole. Allowing for different methods of
marketing generated electricity, green arrows indicate marketing
using a specific RBM archetype. Each RBM archetype may be
complemented by the application of additional supporting activ-
ities as indicated in Fig. 5 and further elaborated in Section 5.2. In
Fig. 5, plus and minus symbols represent the option to adjust the
physical electricity flow by employing additional supporting
activities.
As these examples show, the five archetypes generally differ
with regard to their ability to mitigate individual price risks for the
RES owner. While PPAs may generally have the highest potential to
reduce return risk, in contrast the traditional sale of electricity on
the wholesale electricity market is potentially associated with high
risks in the post FIT era, as depicted in Fig. 5. Table 1 presents the
characterization of each RBM archetypes along the nine dimensions
of the business model canvas, including an overview of related
literature and real-world examples that served as instances of the
RBM archetypes.
5.2. Supporting service layers
When renewable electricity is marketed via a specific RBM
archetype or a combination of the archetypes, it may additionally
be complemented by three supporting service layers. This section
will describe how the three layers infrastructure services (1), elec-
tricity storage services (2), and ancillary services (3) may reinforce
the value creation of the different RBM archetypes. The three ser-
vice layers are interdependent and may positively influence each
other, which is why layers may be applied individually, but also in
any combination. For example, while the storage layer may pri-
marily support an RBM by intertemporally optimizing the sale, use,
and purchase of electricity, it may also improve possibilities to offer
more complex ancillary services.
5.2.1. Infrastructure services.
Infrastructure services refer to the use of the technical features of
the RES plant and its infrastructure. For example, such technical
characteristics and features primarily encompass the possibility of
positioning PV panels toward the sun or aligning the rotor blades of
a wind turbine to the current wind direction by adjusting the cur-
rent feed-in. These characteristics shape the boundary conditions
for each RBM because they influence electricity generation vol-
umes. In addition, infrastructure services have the potential to
support RBMs through non-electricity-related revenue streams,
such as the sale of operational data of the RES plant, collected
climatological data, or the use of the tower of a wind turbine for 5G
antennas in rural areas.
5.2.2. Electricity storage services.
Electricity storage services increase the RBM by allowing for a
temporal shift in electricity feed-in or consumption through the
charging and discharging of electricity storage. Energy storage
services may even support demand side management (e.g., load
shifting of a power-to-X system). Such inter-temporal demand
shifts may, in general, be supported by an ongoing decision support
based on available information and optimization systems [74].8
Electricity storage can increase revenues by exploiting inter-
temporal electricity price differences in respective markets.
Moreover, electricity storage services may also be deployed in RBMs
that are based on self-consumption to increase self-sufficiency and
reliability via self-generated electricity or to reduce costs, for
example, in the form of saved supply or demand charges.
5.2.3. Ancillary services.
The provision of ancillary services to grid operators in the form of
feed-in flexibility represents another possible source of additional
revenue. Corresponding revenue schemes may be defined within a
flexibility performance contract between a flexibility provider (the
RES owner) and a flexibility aggregator and depend on actual
markets for ancillary services [75]. The involved flexibility aggre-
gators may pool several RESs and partially remotely control their
electricity feed-in. Because RESs have a natural limitation when
providing ancillary services, that is, RESs are only able to offer ser-
vices in a negative direction (power reduction), a combinationwith
an electricity storage service may significantly increase the added
value of the ancillary services layer. Table 2 provides further ex-
amples of applications alongside the five RBM archetypes as well as
an overview of related literature and real-world examples.
6. Discussion and policy implications
In the following subsections, we discuss the implications of our
RBM typology from two perspectives: First, we consider the
perspective of an RES owner facing the challenge of ensuring a
viable operation in a post FIT era. We argue that RES owners may
use the typology to identify and finally evaluate new business op-
portunities with respect to their risk and return profiles as well as
the operational applicability of each RBM archetype. Second, we
consider the perspective of a policy maker, discussing policy im-
plications that arise from each of the identified RBM archetype and
further discuss directions for market-based or intervention-based
future energy policy approaches.
6.1. RES owner perspective post FITs
Alongwith the expiration of FITs, businessmodels relying on the
wholesale electricity market may not represent an economically
viable prospect for RES owners, as discussed in Sections 2 and 3. In
extreme cases, temporally negative electricity prices may occur as a
consequence of (1) positively correlated feed-in of intermittent
RESs in the wholesale electricity market, (2) missing incentives for
RESs that still receive a FIT to vary electricity feed-in, and (3)
missing demand and supply flexibilities.
Against this background, the proposed RBM typology provides
new perspectives for RES owners to market electricity by imple-
menting and combining different RBM archetypes, possibly
together with additional services. Thereby, the RBM typology re-
veals new prospects for RES owners to discover, specify, and exploit
new business opportunities beyond the traditional wholesale elec-
tricity market. RES owners may apply commonmethods [84e86] to
evaluate the risk and return profiles of specific RBM archetypes.
From the perspective of an RES owner, a FIT guarantees a riskless
RBM for an ex-ante known time. However, FITs typically expire
abruptly on a cutoff datewithout a smooth transition phase, leaving
RES owners without any guaranteed remuneration from one day to
the next. Therefore, viable business model alternatives must be
implemented immediately after the expiration of a FIT to ensure a
seamless business model transition. Thus, RES owners search for
business models that can be implemented in a short time frame. If
RES owners perceive business model alternatives not to be
economically viable or simply operationally not applicable shortly
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ing RESs. This might highly endanger the future operation of RESs
and consequently pose a risk to the energy transition itself.
Therefore, RES owners that face the expiration of FITs should not
only account for characteristics such as risk and return profiles but
also for the ability to operationalize a business model alternative.
Although some business model alternatives may be very attractive
from the risk and return point of view, they may face high technical
complexity or even require changes in the regulatory environment.6.2. Policy maker’s perspective post FITs
FITs not only lead to distorted wholesale electricity market
prices, but the reallocation of existing FITs via levies and charges to
consumers also bears an increasing burden for the societal goal of
affordable electricity. In recent years some policy makers switched
from offering standardized fixed FITs to new approaches such as
competitive bidding, where investors place bids for a fixed FIT.
Undoubtedly, there is a need to look for other intervention-based or
even market-based approaches for RES expansion. Competitive
bidding may reduce the overall financial burden of FITs on the so-
ciety as lower FITs can be achieved by competition between in-
vestors. However, such approach is particularly useful for deploying
new, additional RES in the electricity system and not a solution for
existing plants whose FIT expire. Hence, policy makers urgently
need to answer the following question(s): how should stakeholders
react to the expected changes induced by the expiration of FITs,
which may ultimately impede the profitable operation of RESs, and
how should the stage be set for alternative RBMs?
To answer the above question(s) in the transition phase towards
a post FIT era and a potential full market integration of RESs, policy
makers must form a regulatory framework for new viable business
models. Without well-established answers, declining revenues for
RESs on the wholesale electricity market yield to the threat that an
active market participation with no state-guaranteed payments
may result in a shutdown of existing RESs and a reluctance for
future investments.
Confronted with expiring FITs, policy makers must choose a
path of market-based or intervention-based policy approaches,
leading to the next era of energy transition. Before choosing andFig. 5. Typology of RBM archetypes
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implementing their policy approach, policy makers must
acknowledge that a transition between both approaches may cause
severe challenges and economic distortions, as we illustrated in
Section 2. Intervention-based policy approaches that entail specific
regulatory interventions appear to be conceivable when it comes to
certain issues of fair cost or welfare distribution, the pricing of
external costs such as emissions, or the promotion of new tech-
nologies [8,87]. In contrast, market-based policy approaches appear
to create the most efficient outcomes, which is why there is a
growing consensus that RESs should no longer be insulated from
competitive market prices and associated risks; see Ref. [88e90].
However, policy makers must carefully design the transition phase
to an era post FITs to avoid welfare losses and negative effects on
the rents of both consumers and producers. As regulatory un-
certainties are key factors that hamper private investments and
negatively influence investors’ decisions, energy policy must
generally provide RES owners with security for planned (re-)in-
vestments in any case [6,14,89,91e93]. Ultimately, the selected
energy policy approach must set the stage for a new era in which a
stable environment fosters future RBM innovations and private
investments in existing and new RESs. With respect to stable policy
conditions, we highlight the following three avenues of policy
implications for different RBM archetypes:
1) Wholesale electricity market: Develop new market-based ap-
proaches to solve structural challenges induced by intermittent
RESs, for example, incorporating flexibility.
Given the threat of a non-viable operation of RESs in an era post
FITs, on the one hand, we may observe an increased lobbying for
new public interventions in the form of state subsidies and fall-
arrest solutions, mitigating the risk of market distortions in the
near future [21]. On the other hand, lobbying for RBMs relying on a
full market-integration of RESs may occur simultaneously. We posit
that it may not be advisable to select a further intervention strategy
in the wholesale electricity market since it bears the risk of exacer-
bating market distortions in the long-term or delaying the struc-
tural challenges of intermittent supply. The transition into a post
FIT era should therefore be accompanied by a transition and dis-
cussion of a new era of necessary electricity market designs. Oneand supporting service layers.
Table 2
Supporting service layer characterization.





 Data provision and commercialization: When
the RES is in service, operational data about the
plant may be collected and offered to
manufacturers or other service companies for
plant improvement or maintenance business
models. In addition, local weather data could be
collected and marketed for research and other
purposes.
 Commercialization of the RES infrastructure: The
infrastructure of the RES itself (e.g., the mast of a
wind turbine) can add value for other services.
As an example, the mast could be used in rural
areas or near urban settlements as an antenna
for the expansion of a 5G-infrastructure, thereby
reducing the need to build new infrastructure.
 Renewal/Repowering of the RES infrastructure:
Due to enormous technological progress in
recent years and decades, it may be worthwhile
to renew RES components, Thus, electricity
output may increase and/or costs of the plant per
unit of generated electricity may decrease in
order to support an RBM archetype.
 Wholesale electricity market: Refers to the use of
feed-in flexibility to increase and stabilize
wholesale electricity market revenues at a
higher level.
 Self-consumption: Increasing the share of own
electricity consumption reduces the demand
for external electricity supply and increases
potential electricity bill savings.
 Physical power purchase agreements: Use of feed-
in flexibility increases revenues on the physical
peer-to-peer market, as feed-in is possible at
peak demand times.
 Nonphysical power purchase agreements: Use of
feed-in flexibility is integrated in the remuner-
ation scheme of the PPA by, e.g., higher basic
remuneration, since the feed-in profile is better
adapted to the required load profile.
 On-site power-2-X: Optimized utilization of the
conversion facility through a more continuous
inflow from the combination of storage and RES
generation leads to further reduced electricity
conversion costs. In addition, in any RBM
archetype electricity can be purchased and
stored via the electricity storage and, if
necessary, resold or used to support the
economic value of each RBM archetype.
 Wholesale electricity market Provision of
negative balancing power capacities via
temporal reduced RES feed-in through pooling
by an energy service provider.
 Self-consumption: Since this RBM archetype
often involves flexible loads in order to
maximize self-consumption, e.g., (positive/
negative) balancing power can be provided
through flexible loads and the RES in collabo-
ration with an energy service provider.
 Physical power purchase agreements: Provision
of negative balancing power capacities via a
temporal reduced RES feed-in through pooling
by an energy service provider.
 Nonphysical power purchase agreements:
Provision of negative balancing power
capacities via a temporal reduced RES feed-in
through pooling by an energy service provider.
 On-site power-2-X: The conversion plant itself
may offer (positive/negative) balancing power.
The offering of balancing power is only
intended to serve as an example for ancillary
services here. Depending on the energy system,
other mechanisms may be suitable and useful.
In addition, the supporting layer of the
electricity storage offers an opportunity to
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ibility from the demand- and supply side in the energy system to
structurally counteract and address the fundamental challenges of
intermittent supply [36,94].
2) Self-consumption, physical PPAs, and nonphysical PPAs: Design
interventions carefully based on long-term energy system goals
alongside a long-term oriented legal RBM framework.
For RES owners, evolving RBMs have the potential to mitigate
electricity price risks via pre-determined remuneration schemes.
One possible intervention relates to the fact that the three corre-
sponding RBMs often build on demand for “green-labelled”, i.e.,
low-carbon electricity. Strengthening the position of green elec-
tricity certificates poses a way to set the stage for these business
models. In addition, the economic viability of the two RBMs self-
consumption and physical PPAs relies on reduced grid fees. For
example, self-consumption as a business model often requires no
public grid because electricity is consumed on-site. Reduced grid
fees and taxes may encourage self-consumption and physical PPAs.
Concurrently, questions about a fair societal distribution of public
infrastructure costs may arise. Promoting these RBMs fosters the
decentralization of supply and demand. However, many countries
are expanding their transmission grids to secure a supply of de-
mand. As a result, reducing grid fees for self-consumption and
physical PPAs affects the refinancing of electricity grid infrastructure
and may counteract a socially fair distribution of associated costs.
As market participants on the electricity supply or demand side
may avoid grid fees, the financial burden due to infrastructure-
related costs increases for the remaining market participants.
Nonetheless, the question of fair social cost distribution depends on
individual regulatory conditions in place or the adjustments made.
Therefore, mechanisms to refinance public transmission grids may10not solely rely on fees per transmitted electric work but on the
absolute peak electric capacity transmitted within a predefined
time period. Thus, in situations of peak transmission capacity uti-
lization, high grid fees may arise. In any case, policy makers should
decide on approaches that take a long-term perspective on the
general development of the energy system. Instead of new
technology-specific short-term funding in response to calls for
strengthening (existing) renumeration schemes, RBMs require a
reliable legal framework in the long-term. Creating such a legal
foundation for RBMs must take interdependencies with the
wholesale electricity market as well as technological and operational
differences between the RBMs into account.
3) On-site power-2-X: Consider an integrated perspective on sector
coupling with all its complexities between existing markets and
interventions in other sectors when designing market-based or
intervention-based policy approaches.
In the energy transition, where sector coupling might serve as a
fundamental building block [95], the corresponding RBMs have the
potential to opening-up new and indirect markets for RESs. Many
technologies in the power-2-X sector require further improve-
ments in efficiency before being economically viable. Therefore,
policy makers need to support technology development to enable
and accelerate their contribution to the energy transition.
With further technological progress, energy policy should take
an integrated view on influences on the design of different energy
markets as well as the interdependencies between them and
emerging technologies [96], avoiding a slowdown by regulatory
barriers that may ultimately stall sector coupling. In many coun-
tries, not only wholesale electricity markets but also other energy
markets face distortions due to intervention-based policies. For
example, tax cuts might distort a national fuel market. Instead of
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should consider changing cross-market rules to foster the adoption
of (on-site) power-2-X RBMs. Thereby, policy makers should
reflect on and learn from successes and mistakes of past policy
approaches.
As today’s energy systems are increasingly interconnected
across borders (e.g., the European integration or the Pan-Arabian
power grid projects), we finally note that national climate and
energy policy decisions should be coordinated between countries
[97] to avoid unnecessary regulatory complexity that will create
further uncertainty accompanied by increased costs for RES
owners, for example, those in the form of complex legal consul-
tancy. In this way, energy policy should set the stage for the next era
of energy transition, including the development of flexibility op-
tions or power-trading products to ensure global energy transition
goals to be realized through effective RES utilization [86,98,99,103].
7. Conclusion, limitations, and future research
The integration of RESs in energy systems has the potential to
reduce greenhouse gas emissions. FITs have been introduced to
foster the development of RESs. Their financing through levies has
led to a financial burden for many electricity consumers. Further-
more, FITs and an associated higher share of RESs combined with
insufficient system flexibility led to a distortion of wholesale mar-
ket prices with declining, even negative, wholesale electricity pri-
ces in periods of high RES electricity generation. In the coming
years, RESs without FIT will have to compete with RESs that still
receive a FIT on the same wholesale electricity markets. As a result,
RESs without FIT may be systematically driven out of wholesale
electricity markets, leaving RES owners to uncertainty about
operational viable business models without granted FIT.
Against this background, this article emphasizes the need for
alternative RBMs that may enable a viable operation of RESs in the
post FIT era. Therefore, this paper first contributes to an under-
standing of the challenges associated with the expiration of FITs.
Second, a typology from the RES owner perspective is proposed
that encompasses five RBM archetypes grounded on distinctive
characteristics along the nine dimensions of the business model
canvas [28]: wholesale electricity market (1), physical power pur-
chase agreements (2), nonphysical power purchase agreements (3),
self-consumption (4), and on-site power-2-X (5). Furthermore, three
supporting service layers are introduced to enhance the profit-
ability of the RBM archetypes via additional revenue streams:
infrastructure services (1), electricity storage services (2), and ancil-
lary services (3). Discussing energy policy implications, we present
specific policy implications embedded per RBM archetype. In
addition, we argue for stable conditions for private investments,
the need for a clear decision on the character of future RES policy,
and the urgent need to develop a corresponding long-term
perspective for viable RES operation and energy system transi-
tion. This study extends the current literature by revealing new
perspectives on business opportunities for RESs in the post FIT era
and may contribute to the substitution of fossil energy sources by
outlining strategies for sustainable business development, as pro-
posed by Lund [100].
Further research may be needed to quantify the economic po-
tential of each RBM archetype with respect to different regulatory,
technological, and market conditions taking individual preferences
of RES owners and investors toward risks into account. As the
adoption of the proposed RBM archetypes may bear considerable
operational complexity that is beyond the capabilities of RES
owners, we emphasize research on (new) actors providing addi-
tional services to RES owners to enable the adoption of future
business models.11With respect to policymaking, future work should further
analyze how the regulatory environment could be designed to
support RBMs that promise high greenhouse gas reductions. Future
research should consider the individual energy policy goals of a
country with respect to the energy trilemma. Thereby, it is essential
to take the general electricity market design into account, as cor-
responding design elements will shape the environment in which
new RBMs may evolve. In this context, we strongly encourage
future studies to focus on attainable reductions of welfare losses
and the “fair” distribution of producer and consumer surpluses. As
such endeavors require an intense knowledge-sharing of natural
scientists, engineers, economists, and lawyers, we appeal to employ
interdisciplinary research approaches to accompany the complex
development of future energy systems.
In summary, our RBM typology offers a deepened understand-
ing of the challenges RES owners and policy makers encounter in
the post FIT era. We present business models that may further in-
crease the share of RESs and contribute to a low-carbon future
electricity system.
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